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Introduction: Connecting Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia

Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann

The idea for this volume grew out of a panel organized for the annual congress of the European Association of Southeast Asian Studies (Euroseas) held in Paris, France, in September 2004. The panel was entitled “Between Imperial Retreat and the Cold War in Asia: Early Western and Southeast Asian Responses (1949–1962).” The principal idea was to try to bring together scholars working on different countries and using different sources and approaches in order to get a variety of “takes” on the connections between two historical phenomena: the Cold War and decolonization in Southeast Asia. Another, equally important goal of this conference and book project was to bring into that discussion scholars from and working in the region, something which is perhaps not as common as it should be in the field of international and Cold War history. Thanks to the generous support provided by the EuroAsia Foundation, the Cold War International History Project, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Institut d’Asie Orientale in Lyon, we were able to do this. Collaboration with scholars from the region is a crucial step in building a truly international history of Southeast Asia.

Working as an international team, we sought to examine how decolonization and the Cold War intersected in complex ways in Southeast Asia. Most studies tend to treat the Cold War and decolonization in Southeast Asia as two separate historical processes. This separation occurs in terms of both dividing the process of decolonization from that of the Cold War thematically and analyzing the question from either a Western-oriented, mainly American perspective, or from a Southeast Asian if not national one. Rather than focusing on the “West” or the “rest,” or on the Cold War at the expense of decolonization, the contributors to this volume chose to focus on connections—various intersections between de-

colonization and the Cold War—and they do so from different geographical vantage points in the making of Southeast Asian international history. Connections between these two narratives are thus at the heart of this volume, for they help illuminate historical linkages in the international system running horizontally from East to West, vertically from North to South, transversally across the South itself and in various thematic ways as the chapters in this book demonstrate using new sources and approaches.¹

Four principal historical trajectories emerge from the chapters in this volume and serve as a compass for identifying connections developed by the authors. First, the historical phenomena of decolonization and the Cold War influenced the global “South” most profoundly in Asia. The Japanese overthrow of Western empires across Southeast Asia during World War II meant that the historical process of decolonization started in Asia before spreading across the South along a horizontal axis to Africa. Ho Chi Minh and Sukarno both announced the independence of their countries in August 1945 as the Japanese empire crumbled but before the French and the Dutch could reassert theirs. Undeclared in Europe, the British would interpret decolonization differently. India and Burma would obtain their independence through political rather than military means shortly after the war, but it would take more time and violence before the British decolonized in Malaya, as Danny Wong demonstrates in his contribution.

Second, the Cold War also first entered the “Southern” part of the international system via Asia, especially through China and then Korea and Vietnam. The Chinese communist victory of 1949 not only reinforced the development of a Eurasian “internationalist” corridor running from Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe to the South China Sea, but it also intertwined with the various strands of decolonization of the region already underway. While this connection was certainly not absent in Africa or the Middle East, the Cold War and decolonization collided most intensely at first in Asia. Even as Stalin initially viewed Asia as a secondary Cold War staging ground, he reinforced this revolutionary shift along a Eurasian trajectory by handing over direction of the Asian revolution to Mao in 1949–1950.² Meanwhile the Americans stepped in to hold the line against a perceived communist deluge into Southeast Asia. This would have a wide range of implications for South and Southeast Asian leaders from 1950 onward. As Tuong Vu shows in his chapter, the arrival of the Cold War served Vietnamese communist interests better than some have thought, not only in terms of forcing France’s hand in Indochina but also in terms of pushing through revolutionary social change for the Vietnamese communists. Viewed from another vantage point, however, this interfacing of the Cold War and decolonization in increasingly intense ways was exactly what Indonesian,

Burmese, and Indian non-communist leaders did not want (see chapter eight on India’s dilemma when it came to choosing between the two Vietnams).

Third, it is too often forgotten that there was nothing necessarily “inevitable” about decolonization, as Anne Foster shows in chapter three and Tony Stockwell has warned elsewhere.³ The Dutch and the French returned to Southeast Asia determined to rebuild their colonial states and erase humiliating defeats in 1940. Empire was seen as an important instrument to ensuring their continued role as viable and respected powers in the international system. Charles de Gaulle put it aptly to the French Consultative Assembly in May 1945: “Ladies and gentlemen, let it never be forgotten: Without the empire, France would be but a liberated country. But thanks to the Empire, France is among the winners.”⁴ It is also worth recalling how the intersection of the Cold War and decolonization prolonged or hastened decolonization on the diplomatic front. Thanks to the Cold War and the fact that the Vietnamese nationalist movement was directed by a communist party, the French were able to gain American support and prolong their colonial presence in Indochina, as Mark Lawrence shows in chapter one. In Indonesia the opposite development resulted. As Samuel Crowl demonstrates in chapter nine, the Dutch lost their colonial claim to Indonesia on the diplomatic front to non-communist Indonesian nationalists when the United States, fearful of communist exploitation of anticolonialism, pressured the Dutch to recognize the reality of decolonization.

Fourth, caught in the middle, non-communist and newly decolonized Southeast Asian countries such as India, Burma, and Indonesia began to plot a “third way,” a more neutral path consciously cutting horizontally across the global “South.”⁵ This third way was a reaction to the expansion of the Cold War into the Asian region, as well as out of desire to end colonialism and continued Western intervention. The wars in Vietnam and Korea, for example, caused the Indian government to intervene in the search for negotiated solutions, reaching out to support Zhou Enlai’s efforts to neutralize Southeast Asia and Indochina at the Geneva Conference of 1954.⁶ The first conference of what came to be known as “non-aligned” countries, held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, grew out of similar Indian and Indonesian efforts to find a non-communist, neutralist solution to the wars in Korea and Vietnam that precluded the continued meddling of Western countries with neo-imperial ambitions. Symbolic of the Southern shift of decolonization, the Bandung meeting was officially referred to as the Afro-Asian Conference. It was also at this point, as Chen Jian argues in chapter six, that the Chinese communists—considering themselves both Southern and “internationalist”—sought to turn decolonization their way by adopting a policy of “coexistence” with the emerging non-aligned countries in the South based on a shared history of opposing Western colonial exploitation.

Bringing out these connections in an intelligible way in more than a dozen chapters is admittedly a very daunting task. It is necessary to give the essays an order capable of teasing out the different ways that decolonization and the Cold War intersected along different national and cultural trajectories in the making of the postcolonial international system in Southeast Asia. To do this, we have organized the chapters along four linkages:

- Western trajectories
- Internationalist communist linkages
- Southeast Asian alignments and non-alignments
- Cultural connections: religion, society, and civilization

These “connective categories” are by no means mutually exclusive and can overlap in time and space, as they most certainly did at the time. For example, although Ngo Dinh Diem’s Republic of Vietnam and Phibun Songkhran’s Thailand adopted foreign policies of an anticommunist nature, they simultaneously and genuinely shared the anticolonialism of their less-aligned Asian “brethren,” such as India. Edward Miller and Daniel Fineman make this point, respectively, in chapters fifteen and eleven. One non-communist Vietnamese diplomat intimately knowledgeable of Thai affairs remarked once to co-editor Christopher Goscha that Phibun Songkhran had confided to him in private in mid 1954 that the Vietnamese defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was one of the happiest days of his life. We have no reason not to believe him, even though Phibun had already allied Thailand in a “revolutionary” relationship with the United States.

The structure of the book is designed to show how these themes overlapped, intersected, and connected at different points in time and space. Our hope is that this more geohistorical approach to the question can help readers visualize these linkages in a wider framework than is often the case. After all, it could be argued that Phibun’s unprecedented alliance of Thailand with the Americans in 1950 was as revolutionary as Truong Chinh’s decision to link Vietnam so closely to a communist world based out of Moscow (compare Daniel Fineman and Tuong Vu’s conclusions). And these connections did not just move in geopolitical ways. As part three reveals, decolonization and the Cold War also intersected in the making of culture, society, and religion in Southeast Asia; these forces, in turn, influenced decolonization and the Cold War.

Temporally, we have limited our book to the period between the end of World War II in 1945 and 1962. Admittedly, 1962 is something of an arbitrary date. We could not cover the entire period of the Cold War or decolonization in one volume much less a single conference. This year seemed nevertheless to constitute a reasonable break-off point, as 1962 marked the end of the Sec-

ond Geneva Conference on Laos and the further intensification of the conflict in Vietnam, among other things. Given the richness of the sources and the interests of our authors, we found it much more useful to concentrate on the earlier period in order to provide a more focused account.

The first section of the volume, “Western Trajectories into Southeast Asia,” starts us off by considering how Western powers—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—reacted to the intersection between decolonization and the Cold War. Mark Lawrence shows how the arrival of the Cold War in the late 1940s allowed the French to recast their neo-colonial Bao Dai solution as an integral part of the anticommunist struggle, a cause now worthy of American support. The Americans found it harder to deal with the newly decolonized state of Indonesia whose leaders favored a non-aligned approach to the coming of the Cold War instead of containment. Richard Mason takes up this matter in chapter two. Focusing on the Dutch, Anne Foster suggests in chapter three that the loss of the Indies to Indonesia was indeed a traumatic event; however, the arrival of the Cold War provided a timely explanation for their departure and assigned them a new role in the global Cold War. Martin Thomas takes up the question from an original angle in chapter four by considering how British intelligence services “processed” decolonization and the Cold War in Vietnam and Indonesia and the impact this had (or didn’t have) on British decision making after World War II.

Part two takes up the question from the “other side” by looking at “International Communist Intersections in the Region.” Ilya Gaiduk argues convincingly in chapter five that while the Soviets may have confided leadership of the internationalist revolution in Asia to the Chinese, this does not mean that they were bent on promoting world revolution. Stalin had little confidence in the prospects of communist revolution for decolonizing Southeast Asia, contrary to what many have written since then. Chen Jian comes at the question from another angle by examining how Chinese communists developed a foreign policy “bridging” decolonization and revolution. Nowhere was this better seen than in the Chinese ideological discourse on Bandung, which allowed Chinese internationalists to present themselves as members of the emerging South. Tuong Vu breaks with the reigning interpretation of Vietnamese communists’ attitude toward the coming of the Cold War by arguing in chapter seven that ranking leaders of the Indochinese Communist Party not only cheered but signed up to serve on the internationalist communist front in Southeast Asia. It legitimated their cause and allowed them to push through radical changes on the inside.

Caught between these two trajectories was a Southeast Asian region torn between alignment and non-alignment and this as decolonization was still in full-

swing. In his chapter, Christopher Goscha shows the degree to which the Cold War choice between Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam pointed up major shifts in the international system. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam chose to ally itself with the communist bloc, whereas non-communist Asian countries such as Indonesia, Burma, and India steered a neutral course when pressed by the blocs to recognize one of the two Vietnams. Samuel Crowl examines this further in chapter nine on Indonesia's "diplomatic revolution" of a non-aligned kind. Danny Wong, on the other hand, shows in chapter ten how the war over Vietnam deeply influenced Malaysian diplomacy leading it to lean to one side in the international system, an anticommunist one. Daniel Fineman and Ang Cheng Guan make similar connections in chapters eleven and twelve. In the case of Thailand, Fineman reveals the extent to which Phibun Songkhrum revolutionized Thai foreign policy by aligning Bangkok's foreign policy closely to that of the United States. Ang Cheng Guan considers how non-communist Southeast Asian governments perceived the domino theory in the 1950 and 1960s.

Decolonization and the Cold War also connected in cultural and religious ways, something that has only begun to be studied in the international history of Southeast Asia. And yet it is one of the most important connections of the time. Focusing on Burma in the 1940s and 1950s, Michael Charney shows in chapter thirteen the extent to which literature and the arts became an essential component of Prime Minister U Nu's policies during the height of the Cold War. Charney also shows how U Nu linked Buddhism to his attempt to unite Burma against perceived communist threats. Rémy Madinier focuses in chapter fourteen on a similar connection during the Cold War in Indonesia, this time between Islam and republicans mobilized against the perceived communist threat between 1945 and 1960. Edward Miller concludes part three with an innovative essay examining how "the diplomacy of personalism"—and not Catholicism—is essential to understanding how Ngo Dinh Diem, the leader of the Republic of Vietnam, used culture and notions of civilization in his Asian diplomacy during the Cold War.

Taken together, these four trajectories intersect to provide, we think, an original perspective on the international history of Southeast Asia during the high period of decolonization and the Cold War (1945–1962).

New Historiographical Trajectories

The historiography on decolonization and the Cold War in Asia is simply massive, a subject in and of itself. Much of it has been important to us in putting this volume together, as we hope the bibliography demonstrates. Both fields have certainly changed rapidly in the last two decades.

Cold War history has seen dramatic change since the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the largely peaceful implosion of the communist regimes in East-Central Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing opening of the former communist-world archives, historians have sought to internationalize the history of the Cold War. Against the backdrop of an era of unprecedented openness and declassification of U.S. government records (during the 1990s), access to the innermost chambers of secrets of the former ruling communist parties from Moscow to Berlin has allowed historians to recast the Cold War in ways unthinkable beforehand. The narrative could now be reconstructed from an international perspective, on a multiarchival basis, overcoming the one-sided perspectives that had dominated scholarship in the East and West.⁷

The sudden end of the Cold War confrontation posed the challenge to historians to write its history knowing the outcome, yet it also allowed them to escape the ideological and political parameters that the Cold War set while it was ongoing. After all, in the Soviet bloc much of the political history was in lip service of the party-state, and the scholarly debate in the United States was all too often a projection of the political and politicized debate over American foreign policy by historiographical means. The "new Cold War history," to borrow John Lewis Gaddis's term, shifted the old debate centered on the question of who was to blame for the rise of the Cold War to rethinking some of the fundamental dynamics of the international history of the second half of the twentieth century: Aside from recasting the Cold War with greater complexity, the "new Cold War history" emphasized, for example, the role of ideas and ideology and the importance of "smaller powers."⁸ Chapters in this volume respond to this renewal of Cold War studies for Asia.

Perhaps the most important recent development in the availability of new sources on the Cold War is the cautious opening by the Chinese government of its foreign ministry archives. Until the 1980s, China scholars in the West had to travel to Hong Kong or Taiwan and rely upon contemporary newspapers, interviews, or Western intelligence estimates of uncertain accuracy to study Beijing's policies. Since then, the policy of reform and opening in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has resulted in a more flexible political and academic environment, leading to relaxation of the extremely rigid criteria for releasing party documents. Although China has passed several archive-related laws and regulations since the early 1980s, setting up (among other things) a thirty-year period for declassifying archival records, until recently, it had still been all but impossible for scholars, both Chinese and foreign, to gain direct access to archival materials of critical importance to post-1949 PRC foreign relations. Scholars had to rely upon "selected documents" published internally or officially to study China's Cold War history. In the 1990s, scholars began

to gain access to original documents at various provincial and regional archives. Most useful among these materials are Chinese Communist Party central committee papers that were relayed to provincial and regional party committees and therefore have been kept at related provincial and regional archives.⁹

Much to the surprise of the scholarly community, and apparently after a struggle between the ministry and party officials, in January 2004, the PRC foreign ministry suddenly announced that it would start opening its records to researchers. Tens of thousands of records have apparently been declassified for the period up to 1965. To be sure, the archival releases in Beijing remain tightly controlled—researchers are only allowed to look at documents in scanned form through a computer terminal. Only a much smaller fraction of the documents that have been declassified have thus far been made accessible in the archive's reading room. Yet the profound impact of these new materials on the scholarly discussion is already visible, and they raise the prospect of the "bamboo curtain" being raised throughout archives in Asia.¹⁰ We can only hope that archives of non-communist, Southern states will undertake comparable projects. After all, the making of the Cold War was not limited to the "East" and the "West." The "South" was an important actor throughout the Cold War.

New works on the South using archives from the communist world countries and China have changed the contours of our understanding of the Cold War in Asia. The work of a remarkable group of Chinese (and Chinese-American) scholars leaves no doubt about this: More recently, Odd Arne Westad and Ilya Gaiduk, among others, have brought new light to Southern questions from the Soviet archives.¹¹ While less archivally based work has been written on South-South ties and the emergence of non-alignment, Janie Mackie has published a very useful short history of the Bandung conference of 1955 focusing on its importance in the history of international relations.¹² Looking at perceptions between North and South, Matthew Jones has written an original essay on how the ideas of race colored American fears of Pan-Asianism at Bandung.¹³

We can only mention some of the most recent works on decolonization. Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong brought together some of the leading international scholars of decolonization in Southeast Asia to consider new perspectives, both empirical and theoretical, on how this process transformed Southeast Asia.¹⁴ Hans Antlov and Stein Tonnesson produced an important study on the interaction between imperial policy and Asian nationalism, which provides new theoretical and methodological approaches.¹⁵ Robert McMahon has blazed the trail in studying the role of American policy in decolonization in Indonesia, Vietnam, and more generally Southeast Asia.¹⁶

Prasenjit Duara has probed the question more theoretically in *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then*.¹⁷

Scholarship linking the Cold War and decolonization is also undergoing a theoretical and archival renewal. As thirty-year rules come into effect, historians have also benefited enormously from the opening of colonial archives in Western Europe. In the formerly colonized countries, fierce nationalist historiography is giving way to more critical approaches to the past. Archives there are beginning to open, albeit slowly, to local and outside scholars. For example, it is possible (though admittedly not easy) to work in national archives in Algeria and Vietnam.¹⁸ In both cases, we are finally getting enough distance from the events and enough access to archival materials to begin to think and work in more historical ways and in less politically volatile conditions. It is an exciting time.

Take, for example, the path-breaking work on Algeria by Matthew Connelly, who shows how the "colonized," in this case the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) leading the independence struggle, were able to play the international system against the "colonizer," in this case the French. Connelly asks how "did Algerians relate their independence struggle to superpower rivalries, and how did the strategies they pursued influence international politics and contribute to their eventual victory?" The colonized were not just or solely victims, but actors in and shapers of the international system in the Cold War era. For Connelly, the FLN was revolutionary in its ability to win independence on the diplomatic front, not on the battlefield. It was, he argues, a "diplomatic revolution," for the "precedents they set would show the way and smooth the path for other national liberation movements.¹⁹ Algeria, however, was not the first "diplomatic revolution" in the post-1945 decolonizing South. The essays in this volume show that the "diplomatic revolution" began in Southeast Asia, where decolonization and the Cold War first entered the South in full force. Indonesians, as noted above, were able to play the Cold War to their advantage on the diplomatic front (and not on the military one), succeeding in gaining American, United Nations, Asian (especially India and Burma), and Muslim support against the Dutch.²⁰ Algeria, as is clear from documents we consulted in the national archives in Algiers in 2005, was seeking and learning from the experiences of the Chinese, Indonesians, Vietnamese, and others. Decolonization, like the international system itself, was internally connected across the South. It is no accident that the Algerian FLN was present in Bandung for the Afro-Asian conference in 1955, hosted by the Indonesians and Indians. All these Southern connections made perfect sense: The Algerian revolution was but one part of a wider revolutionary shift in the twentieth-century international system that started in Asia.²¹

We suggest that such a geohistorical view stressing “connections” can cast new light on important questions in international history that are often lost in national and colonial histories or in approaches focused on the Cold War or decolonization alone. It is only by intersecting these distinct but overlapping trajectories that one can bring out the complexity of decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The essays contained in this volume are, we hope, building blocks toward a new “interconnected” history.

Notes

1. On the importance of connecting as opposed to privileging the “Western” or the “Asian” side at the expense of the other, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1997), 735–62, and Denny Lombard, “Une autre ‘Méditerranée’ dans le Sud-Est Asiatique,” *Hérodote*, no. 88 (1998), 184–93.
2. Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Yang Kuisong, *Changes in Mao Zedong's Attitude towards the Indochina War, 1949–1973*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper 34 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 2002).
3. A.J. Stockwell, “Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of European Colonial Empires,” in Nicholas Tarling, ed., *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 346.
4. Pierre Dapini, “From Indochina to North Africa: French Discourses on Decolonisation,” in *The Sphinx in the Tuileries and Other Essays in Modern French History*, ed. Robert Aldrich and Martyn Lyons (Sydney: Department of Economic History, University of Sydney, 1999), 225, n. 9.
5. Into the 1950s, Indian leaders referred to themselves in “Southeast Asian” terms, a reflection, of course, of the novelty of the idea of “Southeast Asia” itself.
6. This is evident from recently declassified Chinese foreign ministry materials, published in Christian Ostermann, ed., “Inside China's Cold War,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Fall 2007/Winter 2008). See also Pierre Queuille, *Histoire de l'Afro-Asiatisme jusqu'à Bandung: la naissance du Tiers-Monde* (Paris: Payot, 1965); George McTuanan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956); and Jamie Mackie, *Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity* (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005). Tito's non-alignment was born out of a very different historical set of circumstances than Nehru and Sukarno's neutralism. Tito may have broken with Stalin, but he was most certainly communist and believed in exporting revolution, at least in the wake of World War II in the Mediterranean. Georges-Henri Soutou makes this important point in *La guerre de cinquante ans: les relations Est-Ouest, 1943–1990* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 42–44, 213–17. Nehru may have been opposed to aligning with the big powers in the Cold War, but he never tried to export ideological revolution into Burma or Laos. Tito, at least in the wake of World War II, was not opposed to supporting communism outside Yugoslavia's borders.

7. John Lewis Gaddis, “On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War,” in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theories*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London and Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2000), 27–42; and Melvyn P. Leffler, “New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconstructions,” *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 172–97.

8. The most recent statement is John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005). A first synthesis was attempted in Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), in particular his final chapter. See also Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War* (N.Y.: Hill & Wang, 2007); “The Cold War: Inside Enemy Archives,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996), 120–35; “What Do ‘We Now Know’?” *American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (April 1999), 501–25, and “Bringing It Together,” *Reviewing the Cold War*, 47–58. For a critical view, see Geir Lundestad, “How (Not) to Study the Origins for the Cold War,” in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London and Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2000), 64–80. Among the most prominent publications are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). See also the work of Kathryn Weathersby on the Soviet role in the Korean War, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War: The State of Historical Knowledge,” in *The Korean War in World History*, ed. William Stueck (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 61–92; *Should We Fear This? Stalin and the Danger of War with America*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper 39 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 2002); “Stalin, Mao and the End of the Korean War,” in *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); “To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 5 (1995), 1–9. See also other publications by the Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

9. See Christian Ostermann, “Archival Thaw in China,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 16 (Fall 2007/Spring 2008); Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, “The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report of the New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems,” *China Quarterly* no. 122 (Summer 1990), 258–72; Michael Hunt, “CCP Foreign Relations: A Guide to the Literature,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* nos. 6–7 (Winter 1995/96), 129, 136–43; Steven M. Goldstein and He Di, “New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, no. 1 (Spring 1992), 4–6; Chen Jian, “Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China's ‘New Cold War Documentation,’” Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International History, College Park, MD, 1998, <http://www.archives.gov/research/cold-war/conference/chen-jian.html>; Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Introduction; Chen Jian, “Questions Concerning China and the International Cold War,” *Journal of East China Normal University*, December 2001; Shen Zhinua, “To Further Promote the Opening and Publication of China's Historical Archives—Remarks on Reading of ‘Liu Shaogqi's Manu-

scripts since the Founding of the PRC," www.shenzhinhua.net/wsz/000165.htm. For an excellent recent review of Chinese Cold War scholarship, see Yafeng Xia, "The Study of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, no. 10:1 (Winter 2008), 81–115.

10. See also Sulin Zhang, "The Declassification of Chinese Foreign Ministry Archival Documents: A Brief Survey," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, no. 16 (Fall 2007/Spring 2008), 10–11.

11. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ilya Gaiduk, *Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy towards the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963* (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 2003).

12. Jamie Mackie, *Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity* (Singapore: Editions Didier Miller, 2005).

13. Matthew Jones, "A 'Segregated' Asia? Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955," *Diplomatic History*, 29, no. 5 (November 2005), 841–68.

14. Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong, eds., *The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).

15. Hans Antlov and Stein Tonnesson, eds., *Imperial Policy and South East Asian Nationalism* (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1995).

16. Robert J. McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Robert McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981).

17. Prasenjit Duara, ed., *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then* (London: Routledge, 2004).

18. Together with Martin Thomas (Exeter), the coeditors were able to consult the archives of the Algerian nationalist movement (the Front de Libération Nationale) and the provisional government of the Algerian republic during a trip to Algiers in April 2005. Pierre Asselin has done extensive work on international affairs in the Vietnamese archives in Hanoi.

19. Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 33 (2001), 222.

20. Similarly, if the Indonesian and Algerian nationalists were able to use the Cold War to their advantage on the diplomatic front, it is worth noting that for Vietnamese communists the Cold War undermined their ability to secure diplomatic victory in 1954, despite their resounding military victory at Dien Bien Phu. Vietnamese communist nationalists only obtained half of the Vietnam that Ho Chi Minh had declared independent on September 2, 1945.

21. Arguably this started well before 1945 in Europe and elsewhere, but that is another story.

I. Western Trajectories into Southeast Asia

Reassessing the Elysée agreement and the drift of American policy in China and the East
Over the course of the Elysée agreement, it would obviously be critical to understand how French leaders had been influenced, although French leaders had been influenced, they were now being sur-